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STATUTES OF REPOSE-THE DESIGN
PROFESSIONAL'S DEFENSE TO
PERPETUAL LIABILITY
American engineering firms turn away over one billion dollars
of work each year due to the fear of liability.1 The reluctance to
accept work on new or existing projects stems from the fact that
one out of every three firms is sued each year.2 More disturbing is
the fact that thirty-nine percent of all claims made against design
professionals were ultimately resolved without any payment to
the claimant. 3 Imposing this unduly burdensome liability upon
design professionals has quelled innovative designs because of the
heightened susceptibility to law suits. 4
These sobering statistics suggest that design professionals5 are
being sued more often than they should and are serving as scape-
goats for incidents caused by other parties or factors.6 The unjust
1 AMRicAN CONSULTING ENGINEERS COUNCIL AGAINST LAWSUIT ABUSE, DESIGN PROFES-
SIONAL'S COALrrION OF LONG ISLAND 1 (1995) [hereinafter ACEC]. "The average small engi-
neering firm turns down $176,000 in work because of the threat of liability concerns and
90% of all firms have turned down work in the last year." Id.; see also Judy Schriener,
Design Firms "Go Bare" Due to the High Cost of Liability Coverage, ENGINEERING NEWS-
RECORD, Dec. 10, 1990, at 19. This figure does not include the cost of premiums which is
about four percent of a firm's billings. Id. An additional important factor is that approxi-
mately 20% of the consulting engineering firms across the United States do not carry liabil-
ity insurance. Id.
2 Milton F. Lunch, Liability Concerns Reshaping... Legal Environment; Opportunities
and Risks, BUILDING DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION, Oct. 1990, at 84. In addition, 5132 construc-
tion arbitration cases were submitted to the American Arbitration Association in 1990. Id.;
see also Robert Greenstreet, Legal Liability in Perspective P-A Practice, INOGRESSIvE AR-
cHrrEcTuRE, Mar. 1986, at 55 (detailing rising number of claims against design profession
and difficulties in obtaining adequate insurance).
3 See Schriener, supra note 1, at 19. Even where claims are settled successfully, the
design professional spends an average of 115 hours on the case. Id.
4 See ACEC, supra note 1, at 1. A 1994 survey revealed 72% of the firms felt innovative
engineering technology is discouraged because of the threat of lawsuits. Id.
5 See John J. Hare, Selecting the Best Construction Expert, N.J. LAw., Jan. 25, 1993, at
23 (defining terms "architect" and "engineer" under New Jersey law). The term "design
professional" as used in this Note will encompass architects and engineers. Although edu-
cation and licensing requirements are unique to each occupation, the judicial system has
not differentiated between the two when imposing liability. Id.; see also Rabinowitz v. Hur-
witz-Mintz Furniture Corp., 133 So. 498, 499 (La. Ct. App. 1931) (noting that "these two
professions overlap, and in some instances, particularly where structural work is contem-
plated, it might as well be undertaken by an engineer as an architect"); Whiting-Turner
Contracting Co. v. Coupard, 499 A.2d 178, 181 (Md. 1985).
6 William Jackson, Contractors Watch Warily as Court Weighs Design Case, BUSINESS
FIRST (Columbus), May 2, 1994, at 4. Jackson argues that a design professional who has
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placement of liability upon the design professional is magnified as
the completed structure ages.7 Although design professionals cus-
tomarily are involved in the design and construction of a structure
they rarely play a role in its maintenance or repair, particularly
when such maintenance is to be performed over a period of many
years." The unfortunate consequence is that design professionals
are held liable for structures over which they exercise no control.9
Design professionals commonly rely upon a state's statute of
limitations as a defense in such cases. 10 However, a recent judicial
trend across the United States applies the "discovery rule" to stat-
ute of limitations defenses. 1 The discovery rule holds that a cause
of action accrues the date the plaintiff discovers, or should have
discovered, the defect at issue. 12 This has severely curtailed the
protection afforded design professionals by the statute of limita-
tions. 13 In response, many states have chosen to create an innova-
tive alternate shield of protection-statutes of repose.
14
Although statutes of repose are referred to frequently as a type
of statute of limitations,' 5 they are unique and have great signifi-
cance in the context of the construction industry. They embody
important policy decisions, and are imposed in society's best
interest. 16
Part One of this Note will examine the history surrounding lia-
bility of design professionals. It will trace the evolution of design
liability from the imposition of strict liability under the Hammu-
rabi Code to the erosion of the doctrine of privity under United
had no control of a structure for over 25 years should not have to pay insurance premiums
to protect himself from lawsuits arising from the design of that structure. Id.
7 See infra notes 118-120 and accompanying text.
8 See, e.g., BRUCE M. JERVIS & PAUL LEVIN, CONSTRUCTION LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PRAC-
TICE 60 (1988).
9 See, e.g., JAMEs ACRET, CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION HANDBOOK 405 (1986) [hereinafter
CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION HANDBOOK].
10 N.Y. Crv. PRAC. L. & R. 3018(b) (McKinney 1994).
11 See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
12 See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
13 See, e.g., Jeffrey L. Nischwitz. The Crumbling Tower of Architectural Immunity:
Evolution and Expansion of the Liability to Third Parties, 45 OIUo ST. L.J. 217, 228-30
(1984).
14 Milton F. Lunch, Statutes of Repose Under Attack; Laws Protecting Design Profession-
als and Contractors From Suit Are Being Challenged in Oklahoma and Missouri, BUILDING
DESIGN & CONSTRUCTION, Aug. 1990, at 29. The first statute of repose was enacted in 1961
in Wisconsin. Id.
15 See Phillip Purcell, Statutes of Limitation-Clear as Mud Puddles, SPECIFYING ENG'R 59
(Oct. 1987).
16 Nischwitz, supra, note 13.
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States common law. Part Two will discuss the policies and theo-
ries supporting the use of statutes of limitations and their applica-
tion to the design context. The differing judicial interpretations of
such statutes will be addressed, namely the traditional rule and
the discovery rule. Part Three will explain the theory and use of
statutes of repose and their ability to limit the liability of design
professionals. Finally, this Note will advocate the use of statutes
of repose as an effective way to reduce the burden of liability on
design professionals.
I. HISTORY OF DESIGN PROFESSIONAL LILABILITY
The scope of liability imposed upon design professionals for neg-
ligent design claims17 has varied greatly throughout history.' 8 In
ancient Babylon, the Hammurabi Code,' 9 promulgated around
1775 B.C., held that a master builder 20 who designed and built
17 William D. Flatt, The Expanding Liability of Design Professionals, 20 MEM. ST. U. L.
REV. 611, 615 (1990) (tracking different standards used to determine whether liability
should be imposed upon design professionals). This Note will deal only with negligent de-
sign claims. A plaintiff is required to show four elements to prove a prima facie case against
a design professional: (1) the design professional had a duty or obligation to conform to a
required standard of conduct (duty); (2) the design professional failed to conform to the
standard (breach); (3) the design professional's conduct was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's resulting injury (proximate cause); and (4) the injury resulted in actual loss or
damage (damage). Id. at 616. See also Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250,
253 (Utah 1985) (describing elements for negligent design and construction cause of action
in context of architectural landscaping); BLAcK's LAW DICrIoNARY 1032 (6th ed. 1990) (de-
fining "negligence" as "conduct which falls below the standard established by law for the
protection of others against unreasonable risk of harm"). "Malpractice" is defined as:
[Flailure of one rendering professional services to exercise that degree of skill and
learning commonly applied under all the circumstances in the community by the aver-
age prudent reputable member of the profession with the result of injury, loss or dam-
age to the recipient of those services or those entitled to rely upon them.
Id. at 959.
Thus, a malpractice action is brought by the client of the design professional, while a
negligence claim is brought by party who is injured and is not in the professional relation-
ship. See Cubito v. Kreisberg, 69 A.D.2d 738, 742, 419 N.Y.S.2d 578, 580 (2d Dep't 1979),
aff'd, 51 N.Y.2d 900, 415 N.E.2d 979, 434 N.Y.S.2d 991 (1980). The distinction becomes
significant in determining which statute of limitation applies. Id.
'8 See infra notes 19-45 and accompanying text.
19 William H. Rodgers, Where Environmental Law And Biology Meet: Of Pandas'
Thumbs, Statutory Sleepers, and Effective Law, 65 U. COLO. L. REv. 25, 33 (1993). Hammu-
rabi, the King of Babylon, ruled from 1792 to 1750 B.C., and had inscribed almost three
hundred laws into stone pillars to govern people's actions. Id. This code of "stipulated law"
was the first of its kind, as earlier laws were simply the customs and habits of the people.
Id.
20 Jay A. Felli, The Elements of Ohio's Liability Provisions for Contemporary Design
Build Architects an Unwillingness to Expand the Plan, 17 DAYTON L. REV. 109, 110-11
(1991). The historical "master builder" had final authority over the design, engineering,
and construction of the project. Id. The current role of the architect in some cases has
reverted back to this "master builder" notion. Id.; see also Ronald H. Kahn, Introduction:
The Changing Role of the Architect, 23 ST. Louis U. L.J. 216, 217 (1979) (stating that,
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structures was subject to strict liability. 21 This harsh rule inflicted
a punishment upon the master builder equivalent to the damage
caused by the negligent design.22 Roman law23 subsequently mod-
ified this by adding a requirement of privity.24 The master builder
still remained strictly liable for property damage and injuries
caused by faulty design and construction. 25 The law, however, im-
posed a duty to provide adequate plans and specifications for con-
struction only to persons with whom the design professional di-
rectly contracted.26 This policy reduced the number of claims by
substantially limiting the class of persons with standing to sue.2 7
During the Renaissance period," a decrease in the liability of
design professionals could be attributed to a redefinition of the
role of the design professional.29 Complexities in the construction
traditionally, typical master builder "was charged with responsibility for total success of
construction project").
21 CHILPERIC EDWARDS, THE HAMMURABI CODE, §§ 229-33 (1971). The Hammurabi Code
stated:
If a builder has built a house for a man, and his work is not strong, and if the house he
has built falls in and kills the householder, that builder shall be slain. If the child of
the householder be killed, the child of that builder shall be slain. If the slave of the
householder be killed, he shall give slave for slave to the householder. If goods have
been destroyed, he shall replace all that has been destroyed; and because the house
that he built was not made strong, and it has fallen in, he shall restore the fallen house
out of his own personal property. If a builder has built a house for a man, and his work
is not done properly, and a wall shifts; then that builder shall make that wall good
with his own silver.Id.22 Nischwitz, supra, note 13, at 228-30 (discussing law of retaliation).
23 See generally OLGA TELLEGEN-COUPERUS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ROMAN LAW (1993).
The history of Roman law begins in 753 B.C., when the city has been thought to have been
founded, and continues to the date of Justinian's death in 565 A.D. FREDERICK P. WALTON,
HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE ROMAN LAW (4th ed. rev. 1994).
24 WALTON, supra note 23, at 219-21. The punishments were still harsh as the Roman
doctrine of lex talionis controlled. See BLAci's LAW DICTIONARY 913 (6th ed. 1990) ("[An
eye for an eye; a tooth for a tooth.").25 See Felli, supra note 20, at 112. The design professional was still liable for injuries
arising from both the design and the erection of the structure despite the fact that the pool
of claimants with standing significantly decreased under the privity doctrine. See also
CLARENCE W. DUNHAM ET. AL., CONTRACTS, SPECIFICATIONS AND LAW OF ENGINEERS 435
(1979).
26 DUNHAM ET AL., supra note 25, at 429 (discussing how former privity requirement
limited architect liability to persons with whom they contracted).
27 Id. at 435.
28 See generally TREVOR DEAN & KATE LOwE, CRuM, SOCIETY AND THE LAW IN RENAIS-
SANCE ITALY (1994); FREDERIC W. MArLAND, ENGLISH LAW AND THE RENAISSANCE (1901).
Roman law was first taught in England around 1200, about the beginning of the Renais-
sance period which lasted into the 1500's. FRANCIS DEZuLUETA & PETER STEIN, THE TEACH-
ING OF ROMAN LAW IN ENGLAND AROUND 1200 (1990).
29 Felli, supra note 20, at 112-13. The Renaissance period recognized the separation of
duties between the construction of a building and the design and supervision of the same.
Id. Thus, architect liability in this era was limited to negligence with respect to the design
and supervision of the construction. Id. at 113.
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process and time constraints imposed by clients forced the master
builder to specialize nearly exclusively in either the design or con-
struction phase of the project.3 0 Design specialists, for example,
were responsible for the "designing and planning of buildings,"
while having "only supervisory control of the construction pro-
cess."31 This separation of the design and construction phases of a
project reduced the potential liability of design professionals since
they no longer assumed control of the entire project.32
English law, as well as early American common law, assessed
liability only when fraud or collusion was involved.3 3 Over time,
American courts, following the lead of their English counterparts,
expanded liability by recognizing claims based on negligent de-
sign.34 Two rules were applied to this new category of liability: a
requirement of privity between the design professional and the
claimant 35 and an absolute bar to claims against the design pro-
fessional arising after owner acceptance . 6 These two rules pro-
tected design professionals by effectively shielding them from
claims of third parties after acceptance.3 7 This policy encouraged
innovative designs and provided courts with a "bright-line" stan-
dard to determine liability.38
The next major development occurred with the erosion of the
privity doctrine in the early 190Os39 and the ultimate abandon-
30 Hal G. Block, As the Walls Came Tumbling Down: Architects' Expanded Liability
Under Design.Build/ Construction Contracting, 17 J. MARSHis . L. REv. 1, 4 (1984).
31 Id.
32 See, e.g., Felli, supra note 20, at 111. The master builder controlled the entire project
from design to construction and was held strictly liable. Id. As the work of an architect has
become more specialized, their primary responsibility has become the design phase. Id.
Therefore, the justification for imposing strict liability is deflated. Id.
33 Note, The Architect's Tort Liability for Personal Injury, 17 DRAKE L. REv. 242, 242
(1968).
34 Nischwitz, supra note 13, at 217. The author notes that at the time, due to the privity
doctrine, third parties did not benefit. Id.
35 Id. at 220. Thus, if privity was not shown by the claimant the design professional was
not required to present a defense on the merits. Id.
36 Flatt, supra note 17, at 611; see also, Wills v. Black and West Architects, 344 P.2d 581,
584 (Okla. 1959) (demonstrating application of owner acceptance rule).
37 Anthony F. Earley, Liability of Architects and Engineers to Third Parties: A New Ap-
proach, 53 NoTRE DAMm L. Rav. 306, 311 (1977) (stating privity doctrine shields design
professionals from third parties and thus reduces class able to recover).
38 Flatt, supra note 17, at 611-12.
39 Felli, supra note 20, at 114. Traditionally, design professionals were protected from
liability to third parties by the rule enunciated in Winterbottom V. Wright, 152 Eng. Rep.
402 (1842). Lord Abinger, speaking for the court, stressed that reaching beyond the scope of
the contract to impose liability would produce "the most absurd and outrageous conse-
quences, to which I can see no limit." Id. at 405. Privity first came under attack in Mac-
Pherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 390, 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (1916) (establishing
1995]
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ment of privity in the area of architecture and engineering. 40 The
general rejection of the "owner acceptance rule" soon followed.4 '
These two radical changes in doctrine reflected a shifting trend in
the law, emphasizing consumer welfare over design professionals'
creativity.42 The prevailing attitude was that business entities
were better equipped to spread the cost in such cases by obtaining
liability insurance and passing the increased cost of business on to
the clients.43
With the fall of these common law shields, present day design
professionals face an exponential increase in liability. 44 Their lia-
bility extends to a class of people even the ancient Babylonian so-
ciety failed to include in its strict and uncharitable rules.45
that privity is not required in product liability case which resulted in personal injury to
consumer due to manufacturer's negligence). However, the same New York court refused to
extend this rule to professionals in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 188, 174
N.E. 441, 448 (1931) (requiring element of fraud by professional to allow recovery for eco-
nomic loss).
40 See Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 166 F.2d 908, 915 (3d Cir. 1948) (abol-
ishing privity requirement in design-manufacture context), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 846
(1948); United States ex. rel. Los Angeles Testing Laboratory v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F.
Supp. 132, 135 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (holding lack of privity is not viable defense of malpractice
suit); Montijo v. Swift, 33 Cal. Rptr. 133, 134 (Cal. D.Ct.App. 1963) (allowing third party
claim against architect); Paxton v. Alameda County, 259 P.2d 934, 942 (Ca. Ct. App. 1953)
(recognizing negligence standard as basis for architect liability); Miller v. DeWitt, 226
N.E.2d 630, 638 (Ill. 1967) (allowing injured workers cause of action against architect
although no privity existed); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 387, 348 N.E.2d 571,
578, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 122 (1976) (extending liability for patent as well as latent defects);
Inman v. Binghamton Housing Auth., 3 N.Y.2d 137, 143-44, 143 N.E.2d 895, 898, 164
N.Y.S.2d 699, 703 (1957) (allowing architect to be held liable despite absence of privity,
although dismissing negligence action against architect), reh'g. denied, 3 N.Y.2d 941
(1957); Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co., 68 A.2d 517, 533 (Pa. 1949) (stating privity
principle in MacPherson "cannot be made to depend upon the merely technical distinction
between a chattel and a structure built upon the land").
41 Nischwitz, supra note 13, at 622. Some jurisdictions still apply the owner acceptance
rule. See, e.g., Easterday v. Masiello, 518 So. 2d 260, 261-62 (Fla. 1988) (stating that if
defect is patent and owner accepts project, contractor, architect or engineer is insulated
from liability).
42 Flatt, supra note 17, at 615. This trend promoting consumer welfare is evident by the
strict liability standards imposed on product manufacturers. Id.
43 Id. at 619.
44 See id. at 611; see also Boswell v. Laird, 8 Cal. 469, 490 (1857).
45 See State v. Ireland, 20 A.2d 69, 69-71 (N.J. 1941). In Ireland, an architect was in-
dicted for manslaughter when a bathhouse collapsed and killed a woman. Id. at 445. The
design was found to be negligent because it violated the building code. Id. The Court found
the negligent design created a public nuisance and therefore was a continuous offense
which disallowed any statute of limitations defense. Id.; see also JAMES AcRET, ARCHITECTS
AND ENGINEERS 94 (3d. ed. 1993) [hereinafter ARcHmTCTs AND ENGINEERS].
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II. STATUTES OF LIMITATION
With the loss of traditional defenses, design professionals now
must rely heavily upon statutes of limitations defenses to protect
themselves against any unjustified negligence claims.46
These statutes are intended to further several policy interests.4 v
First, the primary purpose of statutes of limitation is to protect
the defendant. 48 These statutes protect the design professional
from the excessive burden of defending claims where "evidence
has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disap-
peared."4 9 Statutes of limitation are also meant to protect against
false and fraudulent claims.50 In addition, public policy dictates
that there should come a time when the design professional is re-
lieved of liability arising from old and stale claims.51 Finally, un-
settled claims disrupt and frustrate the public's interest in finaliz-
46 See Ireland, 20 A.2d at 70-71 (applying statute of limitations proscribing claims after
two year period).
47 See infra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
48 See Note, Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 H~av. L. REV. 1177,
1185 (1950) (justifying legislative decisions which deprive party's right to bring claim when
statute of limitations has elapsed); Andrew Alpern, Statutes of Repose and the Construction
Industry: A Proposal for New York, 12 CARDozo L. REV. 1975, 1990 n.73 (1991). "[T]here
were fewer than 13 claims per 100 architecture firms filed annually in the United States in
the early 1960's. By the mid-1980's the figure had jumped to 42 claims per 100 firms." Id.
(citing Lurie, Architects Drawing More Lawsuits for Malpractice, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 5, 1989,
at K1); Jeffrey R. Cruz, Architectural Malpractice: Toward an Equitable Rule for Determin-
ing When the Statute of Limitations Begins to Run, 16 FoaDHAM Una. L.J. 509, 518 (1988)
(exploring public policy interests in protecting design professionals through statutes of lim-
itation). Concern regarding unlimited liability have a direct impact on professional liability
insurance rates. See also Early, supra note 37, at 316. Furthermore, it is a fear of recovery
"which forces the small practitioner to obtain coverage far in excess of what might be con-
sidered reasonable." Id. Charles P. Kindregan & Edward M. Swartz, The Assault on the
Captive Consumer: Emasculating the Common Law of Torts in the Name of Reform, 18 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 673, 708 (1987) (citing U.S. Dep't of Justice, ATTORNEY GENERAL Comm., RE-
PORT OF THE TORT POLICY WORKING GROUP ON THE CAUSES, ExTENT AND POLICY IMPLICA-
TIONS OF THE CURRENT CmsIs IN INSURANCE AvAnABirrY AND AFFoRDABE.rrY 1-5 (Feb.
1986)). "Proponents of tort reform have argued that American businesses and professionals
are experiencing a 'crisis' in obtaining affordable liability insurance." Id.
49 Shea v. Keuffel & Esser of New Jersey, 668 F. Supp. 41, 45 (D. Mass. 1986). "The
search for truth may be seriously impaired by the loss of evidence, whether by death or
disappearance of witnesses, fading memories, disappearance of documents or otherwise."
Id. Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 293 A.2d 662, 667-68 (N.J. 1972). See Develop-
ments in the Law: Statute of Limitations, supra note 48, at 1185 (quoting Order of R.R.
Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 349 (1944)).
50 JUSTIN SWEET, LEGAL ASPECTS OF ARCHITECTURE, ENGINEERING AND THE CONSTRUC-
TION PROCESS § 23.03, at 495 (5th ed. 1994). The author notes: "[Statutes of limitation] are
designed to protect the defendant from false or fraudulent claims that may be difficult to
disprove if not brought until relevant evidence has been lost or destroyed and witnesses
become unavailable." Id.
51 Id. As memories fade and time progresses, the institution of a claim clearly "sur-
prises" a defendant. Id. By imposing sensible time restrictions, the statutes of limitations
avoid this unfairness. Id.
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ing commercial transactions. 52 Statutes of limitations are affirma-
tive defenses to be pleaded by the defendant, 53 however, statutes
of limitations do not prevent the filing of unjustified claims. 4
Moreover, since each state creates its own statute of limitations, 55
they vary greatly from state to state, and are subject to differing
judicial interpretations.5 6
An additional issue to consider, especially in the construction
context, is whether the design professional should be held to a
higher standard at the time the suit is brought than existed at the
time of design." A jury deciding whether a design professional
was negligent in designing a structure twenty-five years ago
might have a difficult time evaluating the actions of the profes-
sional in the context of the technology available at that past date
and would be likely to impose standards based on present-day
technology.58 In this scenario, the potential for prejudice to the
design professional is enormous.59
Courts have offered two conflicting approaches to interpreting
the application of statutes of limitations to cases involving design
professionals. 61 Some courts read these statutes liberally in an ef-
fort to promote certainty and finality.6 1 Other courts view the de-
fense as a technicality that deprives plaintiffs of an action, and
seek alternatives to enforcing them.62
52 Cruz, supra note 48, at 518. See, e.g., SWEET, supra note 50, at 495. "[Statutes of limi-
tation] work to promote certainty and finality in transactions, by terminating contingent
liabilities at specific points in time." Id.
53 See N.Y. Civ. PaAc. L. & R. 3018(b) (McKinney 1994) ("Affirmative defenses. A party
shall plead all matters ... such as ... statute of limitation."). The defendant bears the
burden of proof in asserting this defense. See, e.g., Martin v. Edwards Laboratories, 60
N.Y.2d 417, 428 (1983).
54 N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R 3018(b).
55 CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 405.
56 Id. at 336.
57 Id. Although it is not legally proper, a jury may be unable to separate the present level
of technology from that which existed at the time the design professional allegedly was
negligent in the design. Id.
58 Id.
59 See Margaret E. Cotter, Comment, Limitations of Action Statutes for Architects and
Builders-Blueprints For Non-action, 18 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 385 (1969) (noting courts
inability to effectively adjudicate, and complexities of proof which arise from passage of
time).
60 See infra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
61 See CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 405 (noting that liberal
construction encourages prompt enforcement of rights when fact finding is easiest).
62 See ARCHITECTS AND ENGINEERS, supra note 45, at 336.
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When applying statutes of limitations, courts have two basic
tasks.63 The first task is to determine which statute of limitations
is applicable to the specific circumstances.64 Second, the court
must determine the point at which the statutory period accrues.6 5
A. The Traditional Rule of Accrual66
The traditional rule holds that a cause of action accrues at the
time of the negligent act,6 7 thereby causing the statute of limita-
tions to begin to run.68 This view focuses on the time of the defend-
ant-design professional's act, rather than the time the plaintiff
discovers the negligent design or construction.6 9 Thus, a cause of
action may accrue long before any actual injury has occurred,7 °
63 See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
64 ARCHITEc'rs AND ENGINEERS, supra note 45, at 336-37. The statute of limitations es-
tablishes certain periods for each cause of action. Id. Typical classifications are: negligence,
breach of warranty, breach of contract, malpractice, bodily injury, property damage, fraud,
deceit, misrepresentation and causes arising under the U.C.C. or special statute (e.g. im-
provements to real property). Id. A criticism of the statute of limitations is that the length
of time for actions based in contract is usually longer than that based in tort. Id. at 337.
Accordingly, it is questionable to hold the defendant open to liability longer on the basis of
contract compared to tort. Id. The problem is especially evident where the design may be
negligent and also a breach of contract. Id. The court must choose which statutory period to
apply. Id. Recovery by the plaintiff may be determined by which period is chosen. Id.
65 CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 405. The time the statute be-
gins to run is generally a question of law which is determined by the court. See Devenney v.
North Franklin Township Volunteer Fire Dep't, 228 A.2d 61 (N.J. 1967); Smith v. Bell Tel.
Co., 153 A.2d 477, 481 (Pa. 1959) (stating "[wihether the statute has run on a claim is
usually a question of law for the judge but where, as here, the issue involves a factual
determination, i.e. what is a reasonable period, the determination is for the jury").
66 Cruz, supra note 48, at 520. Although this is described as the traditional rule, it is
only traditional in the sense it preceded the discovery rule. The more proper term would be
"time of the negligent act." Id.
67 65th Center Inc. v. Copeland, 825 S.W.2d 574, 580 (Ark. 1992) (holding that four year
statute of limitations barred negligent design claim by pedestrian in absence of fraudulent
concealment). See generally, CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION HANDBOOK, supra note 9, § 22.05;
Cruz, supra note 48, at 521.
68 See E.J. Korvette Div. of Spartan Industries, Inc. v. Esko Roofing Co., 350 N.E.2d 10,
11-12 (Ill. 1976) (stating traditional rule but not following it). A number of states still follow
the traditional rule, including Arkansas, Kentucky, Iowa, Florida, and New York. CON-
STRUCTioN LITIGATION HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at § 22.00. However, many of these states
have modified the rule to allow for the continuous treatment doctrine. See, e.g., Board of
Educ. v. Thompson Constr. Corp., 111 A.D.2d 497, 499, 488 N.Y.S.2d 880, 882 (2d. dept.
1985).
69 See E.J. Korvette, 350 N.E.2d at 12; see also Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 508 F.2d
603, 611 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding cause of action accrued for statute of limitations purposes
at time defective materials were installed).
70 CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 348. The time of accrual is the
moment the plaintiff could first maintain a cause of action against the defendant. Id. at
351. Negligent design or construction could constitute legal injury to the plaintiff even if he
is not aware of the wrong. Id. This construction of the time of accrual for statute of limita-
tions purposes has been criticized when applied to situations where the negligent act may
not cause injury until some indefinite time in the future. Id. at 348.
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and the statute of limitations may run long before a defect is
found.7v In support of this view, many courts have held that "mere
ignorance that a cause of action exists will not stop the statute
from running."72 Indeed, a suit may be brought before there is any
palpable injury because the "breach" for which the architect is re-
sponsible refers to the breach of the duty of reasonable care,
rather than the injury itself. 73
This rule varies substantially from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, v4
depending on the services the design professional provides.75
Although it is often assumed that architects and engineers are re-
sponsible solely for the preparation of plans, in reality they fre-
quently are responsible for much more. 6 Courts have noted that
dates of accrual occur at different times, depending upon whether
the design professional was merely the designer of the structure
or more extensively involved in the construction and maintenance
of the structure. 7
71 See, e.g., Mastellone v. Argool Corp., 82 A.2d 379, 383 (Del. 1951); Wellston Co. v. Sam
N. Hodges, Jr. & Co., 151 S.E.2d 481, 482 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966) (holding that right of action
for collapse of roof accrued when building was negligently designed and constructed, not
when building collapsed).
72 See Cruz, supra note 48, at 521.
73 Id. at 521.
74 CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 406. Particularly in construc-
tion cases, it is common for the plaintiff to assert various causes of action for the same
defect. In one California case, a homeowner sued his architect when he noticed hairline
cracks in his home; he alleged fraud, strict liability, negligence and breach of warranty.
McClosky v. Carlton Builders, 211 Cal. Rptr. 659, 659 (1985) (holding that three different
statutes of limitations applied). See also Farash Constr. Corp. v. Standco Developers Inc.,
139 A.D.2d 899, 900, 527 N.Y.S.2d 940, 941 (4th Dep't 1988) (restating New York rule that
claim against design professional for defective construction accrues for statute of limita-
tions purposes upon completion of construction); South Barrington Sch. Dist. v. Goodrich,
382 A.2d 220, 223 (Vt. 1977) (ruling that statute began to run once building was completed,
accepted and architect certified that building was constructed according to his specifica-
tions); Nelson v. Commonwealth, 368 S.E.2d 239, 248 (Va. 1988) (holding that statute of
limitations began to run when design plans were completed and accepted).
75 See, e.g., JERvis & LEiN supra note 8. Although the resulting time of commencement
varies depending on the kind of services the design professional provides, in reality the
traditional rule remains that the statute begins to run "at the time of the negligent act".
See Cruz, supra note 48, at 521-22; see also, SWEET, supra note 50, at 323-24. Thus, the
negligent act itself will differ when the design professional has different duties, but the
statute of limitations starts to run at the time of the negligent act. See generally Nischwitz,
supra note 13, at 234-46 (discussing duties of architect arise in light of various tasks for
which he or she is responsible).
76 See CLARENCE W. DUNHAm & ROBERT D. YOUNG, CONTRACTS, SPECIFICATIONS, AND LAW
FOR ENGINEERS 385-86 (2d. ed. 1971). Besides designing the structure, the architect typi-
cally will also prepare cost estimates, obtain bids from contractors, and inspect the contrac-
tor's work. Id. at 386.
77 See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
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The traditional role of an architect or engineer is to design a
structure, often working in conjunction with an owner to develop a
unique building plan.78 In common practice, the architect specifies
the materials to be used, while the engineer performs the calcula-
tions to assure that the chosen materials are suitable for the de-
sign and location of the structure.79 Where these are the only serv-
ices provided to the owner, the traditional rule is that the statute
of limitations begins to run upon completion and tender of the
design. °
Today, however, it is quite common for the architect not only to
design the building, but also to supervise its construction.8 1
Where this occurs, the statute of limitations begins to run when
the building is completed.8 2 Courts, however, differ in their defini-
tion of a completed building. 3 Some courts have held that a build-
ing is "completed" when it is "substantially complete" or ready for
use by the owner.84 Before the contractor is paid, many states re-
quire the architect to certify that the building is built to the speci-
fications in the design plans, 5 a process called final certification. 6
78 See JERVIS & LEVIN, supra note 8, at 60; Felli, supra note 20, at 115.
79 DUNHAM & YOUNG, supra note 76, at 384-85.
80 See, e.g., Comptroller ex rel. Virginia Military Inst. v. King, 232 S.E.2d 895, 900 (Va.
1977). The Court held that the Institute's action for negligent design accrued when the
architect's designs were accepted and paid for by the institute. Id. The court reluctantly
followed the rule that the statute of limitations begins to run when the cause of action
accrues, not when the injury is discoverable. Id. Additionally, although other claims of the
Institute might not be barred, the negligent design claim was barred. Id. See City of Blue-
field v. Autotrol Corp. 723 F. Supp. 362, 366 (S.D.W.V. 1989) (holding cause of action for
breach of reasonable care in design arose at tender of design).
81 JERVIS & LEVIN, supra note 8, at 62. Thus an architect may offer services to the cus-
tomer, similar to those of a general contractor. Felli, supra note 20 at 115. "The architect's
duty to supervise encompasses two distinct areas: (1) supervision to prevent deviations
from the plans and specifications, and (2) supervision of construction methods and tech-
niques." Nischwitz, supra note 13, at 234.
82 Sears, Roebuck and Co. v. Enco Associates, Inc., 43 N.Y.2d 389, 395, 372 N.E.2d 555,
557, 401 N.Y.S.2d 767, 770 (1977). Two rationales behind this rule are that the architect
had the power to correct any defect in the work prior to its completion, and the owner has a
reasonable expectation that the architect will perform his duties properly, including find-
ing and correcting flaws. CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 353.
83 See supra notes 81-82, infra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
84 Cruz, supra note 48, at 522. "Substantial completion" does not require that every de-
tail is complete. Id. at 522 n.66. "Substantial performance" has been defined as: "[Tihat
performance of the contract which, while not full performance, is so nearly equivalent to
what was bargained for that it would be unreasonable to deny the promisee the full con-
tract price subject to the promisor's right to recover whatever damages may have occa-
sioned him by the promisee's failure to render full performance." Ocean Ridge Dev. Corp. v.
Quality Plastering, Inc., 247 So. 2d 72, 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
85 See Cruz, supra note 48, at 522.
86 Id. Final certification differs from substantial completion in that final certification sig-
nifies that the structure is satisfactorily completed and the owner should now pay the con-
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When a state statute requires it, the courts often hold that a struc-
ture is complete upon final certification.8 7 However, courts are re-
luctant to hold that the statute only begins to run after final certi-
fication when final certification is merely a formality. 8
In states applying the traditional rule of accrual, liability is
often expanded by the doctrine of continuous treatment. 89 This
doctrine was developed in medical malpractice cases, based on the
reasonable expectation that a professional would remedy any mis-
take found in their own work.90 When the design professional con-
tinues to work on a building, the statute of limitations will not
begin to run until the professional relationship is severed. 91
Under this doctrine, the statute of limitations will not begin to
run, even when the architect issues final certification, if he or she
continues to modify an element of the structure. 92 The statute be-
gins to run when the design professional has concluded all modifi-
cations, regardless of how long they take.93
tractor and sever the contractual relationship. Id. at 522 n.66. Substantial completion only
refers to the status of the project being fit for use. Id.; see also JERVIS & LEvIN, supra note 8,
at 74-75.
87 See Board of Educ. v. Celotex Corp., 88 A.D.2d 713, 714, 451 N.Y.S.2d 290, 291 (3d
Dep't 1982), aff'd, 58 N.Y.2d 684, 444 N.E.2d 1006, 458 N.Y.S.2d 542 (1982) (holding that
statute of limitations did not begin to run until architect issued final certification because
facts presented more than ministerial act).
88 See State v. Lundin, 60 N.Y.2d 987, 989, 459 N.E.2d 486, 487, 471 N.Y.S.2d 261, 262
(1983). The court held that the construction was complete for purposes of the statute of
limitations when it was substantially complete. Id. The court did not allow the statute of
limitations to be extended to the time of final certification because it was the owner, as
opposed to the architect, who controlled the issuance of this certificate. As a result, the
issuance of that certificate represents a significant contractual right of the owner and con-
comitant right of the architect. Id.
89 CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION HANDBOOK, supra note 9, § 11.11, at 384. But see Dillon
County School Dist. Number Two v. Lewis Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 332 S.E.2d 555, 560(S.C. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that continuous treatment doctrine did not apply where dis-
covery rule is in effect).
90 See Cotter, supra note 59, at 381.
91 CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION HANDBOOK, supra note 9, § 11.11, at 384. See County of
Broome v. Vincent Smith, Inc., 358 N.Y.S.2d 998, 1000 (Sup. Ct. Spec. T. Broome County
1974) (defining continuous treatment doctrine as accruing when treatment is ended after
course of treatment by professional which includes wrongful acts and omissions that are
continuous); see also Cotter, supra note 59, at 381-82 (discussing physician/patient rela-
tionship as analogous to architect/owner relationship).
92 See Northern Montana Hosp. v. Knight, 811 P.2d 1276, 1280 (Mont. 1991) (holding
that because hospital relied on architect's repeated inspections and assurances that heat-
ing and ventilation problems were due to negligence of hospital employee or contractor,
hospital's cause of action did not arise until professional relationship was severed).
93 See CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION HANDBOOK, supra note 9, § 11.11, at 384-87; § 22.05, at
413-14.
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B. The Discovery Rule
Many actions are barred under the traditional rule because the
statute of limitations expires long before the defect is discovered. 9"
A growing number of jurisdictions, however, have rejected the
traditional rule in favor of the discovery rule.95 Under the discov-
ery rule, the statute begins to run when a person of ordinary intel-
ligence has sufficient facts to know, or to have reason to know,
that a defect exists.9 6
The current judicial trend favors the discovery rule over the
traditional view.97 Although courts seem willing to apply the dis-
covery rule to the construction industry, they often limit the appli-
cation to cases in which the lapse of time does not raise additional
problems of proof or facilitate fraudulent claims.98
Courts generally have held that issues regarding statutes of
limitation are resolved by determining when the plaintiff knew or
should have known of the defect.99 Some courts, however, require
an additional step and hold that, in addition to discovery of the
94 See, e.g., Garvey v. Rosanelli, 601 A.2d 1334, 1338 (Pa. 1992); Argust v. Dick Mackey
Gen. Contracting Co., 568 A.2d 255, 257 (Pa. 1990). The discovery rule applies not only to
personal injury claims but also to property damage claims. Id.
95 Nischwitz, supra note 13, at 224 (noting that discovery rule should be used when in-
jury is "likely to occur long after the negligent act"). There is some question as to whether
the day the action accrues is to be included in the statutory period. See generally James D.
Ghiardi, Statute of limitation-Computing Time, 66 Wis. LAw. 16 (March 1993).
96 CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at § 22.05.
97 See, e.g., Board of Directors of Assoc. of Apartment Owners of Regency Tower Condo-
minium Project v. Regency Tower Venture, 635 P.2d 244, 248 (Haw. Ct. App. 1981) (stating
developer's claims for damages from architectural malpractice were barred by statute of
limitations); Rozny v. Marnul, 250 N.E.2d 656, 663 (Ill. 1969) (holding surveyor liable for
inaccurate survey); Hilliard and Bartko Joint Venture v. Fedco Sys., Inc., 522 A.2d 961, 969
(Md. 1987) (holding that arbitration was timely where owner found defect within one year
and then filed for arbitration within three years where construction contract provided that
contractor would correct defects found within one year of completion of contract); Board of
Regents v. Wilscam Mullins Birge, Inc., 433 NW.2d 478, 484-85 (Neb. 1988) (holding Uni-
versity's action was barred by two year statute of limitations since University knew or
should have known of facts that would have led to discovery of architect's negligence at
earlier date); Hall v. Luby Corp., 556 A.2d 1317, 1318 (N.J. 1989) (holding elevator installa-
tion was improvement to real property within personal injury statute of limitations);
Gevaart v. Metco Constr. Inc., 760 P.2d 348, 349 (Wash. 1988) (holding claims against
builders for negligent construction and design accrued when plaintiff should discover in-
jury resulting from negligence).
98 Golden Grain Macaroni Co. v. Klefstad Eng'g Co., 358 N.E.2d 1295 (Ill. 1976).
99 Allen v. Sundean, 137 Cal. Rptr. 863, 866 (1982). "[A] plaintiffs cause of action for
property damage caused by latent defects accrues 'from the point in time when plaintiff's
became aware of defendant's negligence as a cause. . . .'" Id. Shaw v. Ortell, 484 N.E.2d
780, 787 (Ill. 1984). "Under a discovery rule, a cause of action does not accrue until a person
knows or reasonably should know that it was wrongfully caused. Id.
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defect, the identity of the tortfeasor must be known before the
cause of action accrues. 100
Although the traditional view brings about a fair result when
the injury or damage occurs contemporaneously with the negli-
gent act, this is seldom the case with negligent design claims. 10
Latent design defects may be undetectable until many years after
the statute of limitations has lapsed, leaving the injured plaintiff
with no cause of action against the negligent designer.' 2 Due to
this potentially harsh result of the traditional application of the
statute of limitations, courts have developed the discovery rule. '0 3
III. STATUTES OF REPOSE
For the reasons described above, the statute of limitations de-
fense has not reduced significantly the liability of design profes-
sionals.'0 4 In response, groups such as the Associated General
Contractors of America, National Society of Professional Engi-
neers, and American Institute of Architects have lobbied state leg-
islators to pass special statutes of limitation for design profession-
als, known as statutes of repose. 05 These statutes specify a
100 See CONSTRUCTION LrIGATIoN HANDBOOK, supra note 9, § 22.05, at 413.
101 See Nischwitz, supra note 13, at 223.
102 Id. at 224.
103 O'Brien v. Eli Lilly & Co., 668 F.2d 704, 706 (3d. Cir. 1981) (stating discovery rule is
"intended to benefit plaintiffs in that it avoids potential injustice caused where an injury is
'inherently unknowable' at the time of a defendant's conduct"). The discovery rule was orig-
inally applied in medical malpractice suits. See, e.g., Young Radiator Co. v. Celotex Corp.,
881 F.2d 1408, 1411 (7th Cir. 1989) (discovery rule applies to property claims, as well as
personal injury claims); Hopkins v. Fox, 576 A.2d 921, 922 (N.J. 1990) (providing architect
with repose from 10 years after completion of design not construction); Flanagan v. Mount
Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 429, 248 N.E.2d 871, 872, 301 N.Y.S.2d 23, 25 (1969);
Ayers v. Morgan, 154 A.2d 788, 789 (Pa. 1959) (indicating in dicta that court would be
willing to extend discovery rule to design professionals).
104 See Mills v. Killian, 254 S.E.2d 556, 558 (S.C. 1979) ("The modern trend in profes-
sional negligence or malpractice cases ... is that accrual is upon discovery by the injured
party."). Since the date of accrual could be many years after the design, the design profes-
sional still faces liability well into retirement. Cotter, supra note 59, at 363.
105 Purcell, supra note 15, at 59. The following is a list of statutes of repose which apply
to design professionals: ALA. CODE § 6-5-225 (1994); ALASKA STAT. § 9.10.055 (1983); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-56-112 (1994); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (1992); CAL. CIv. PRAc.
CODE §§ 337.1, 337.15 (West 1982); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-127 (1989); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-577 (West 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8127 (Supp. 1987); D.C. CODE § 12-
310 (Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 95.11(3)(c) (West 1982); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 9-3-51 to 9-
3-52 (1982); HAw. REV. STAT. § 657-8 (1994); IDAHO CODE § 5-241 (1994); IND. CODE ANN.§ 34-4-20-2 (Burns Supp. 1992); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:2772 (West 1990); ME. REV. STAT
ANN. tit. 14, § 752-A (1980); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 5-108 (1991); MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 260, § 2B (West 1992); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 600.5839 (1987); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 15-1-41 (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 516.097 (Vernon Supp. 1994); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-2-208 (Supp. 1987); NEB. RaV. STAT. § 25-224 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 11.202,
11.206 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT ANN. § 508.4-b (1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:14-1.1 (West
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certain length of time during which a cause of action may arise
against the design professional. 106 Once this time has elapsed, all
causes of action are barred completely, regardless of when the de-
fect is discovered. 10 7
As of 1994, forty-six states and the District of Columbia have
enacted statutes of repose for design professionals.10 8 These stat-
utes provide a means for the design professional to combat the far
reaching effects of the discovery rule. 0 9 Without statutes of re-
pose, design professionals are potentially liable as long as their
projects exist.1 0° While these statutes create limited protection for
Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 23-1-26 (Supp. 1975): N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-50(5) (1991);
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01-44 (1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305-131 (1991); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 109 (West Supp. 1988); OR. REV. STAT. § 12.115(1) (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 65.1 (1977); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-29 (1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 15-2-9, 15-2-
11 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-314 (1991); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5536a (Vernon
1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-15-3 (1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-24-2 (1990); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 4.16.300, 4.16.310 (Supp. 1988); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 893.155 (1975); Wyo. STAT. §§ 1-
3-110 to 1-3-112 (1985).
New York is close to passing a statute of repose. See DESIGN PROFESSIONAL'S COALITION
OF LONG ISLAND 1 (3rd Quarter 1995). In 1995 the State Senate voted 51 to 9 in favor of
passing a statute of repose bill (S.2445). Id. The State Assembly however did not vote on its
version of the bill (A.4000) because it was considered too late in the session. Id. Supposedly,
60 out of 150 Assemblypersons have committed their support to the bill. Id. It seems likely
that New York could pass the law sometime in 1996.
106 See BLAC's LAW DIcTIoNARY 1411 (6th ed. 1990). Statutes of repose are also known
as completion statutes. See SWEET, supra note 50, at 510.
107 Universal Eng'g Corp. v. Perez, 451 So. 2d 463, 465 (Fla. 1984). Statute of repose
provisions "cut off the right of action after a specified time measured from the delivery of a
product or the completion of work. They do so regardless of the time of accrual of the cause
of action or of notice of the invasion of a legal right." Id. at 465 (alteration in original). See
Kline v. J.I. Case Co., 520 F. Supp. 566, 566 (N.D. Ill. 1981). "This statute [of repose] ...
limits a manufacturer's potential liability by limiting the time during which a cause of
action can arise ... the statute serves to bar a cause of action before they accrue." Id.
108 Alpern, supra note 48, at 2014-24. Iowa has no statute of repose. Kansas, New York
and Vermont have not specifically enacted statutes for design professionals but in certain
circumstances general statutes are deemed to apply. Id.
109 Nischwitz, supra note 13, at 226. "[Statutes of repose] are the architects most effec-
tive defense against perpetual liability resulting from the application of the time of discov-
ery rule." Id. Statutes of repose are not exclusively used in the design professional scenario.
For example, President Clinton signed into law a federal statute of repose applicable to
personal injury and property damage claims against general aviation manufacturers. Don-
ald R. Andersen, Recent cases and Developments in Aviation Law, 60 J. AIR L. & CoM. 3, 80
(1994). The statute, part of the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, was signed on
August 17, 1994, and provides an 18 year period in which to bring an action. Id.
110 See Alpern, supra note 48, at 1978-79 n.23. An example of the extremes of the discov-
ery rule is the notorious "Leaning Tower of Pisa" case. Construction started on the tower in
1170 and, despite reports that revealed soil conditions unsuitable for construction, the 179-
foot building was completed. Although the media insisted the tower had been falling for
more than 500 years, an Italian appellate court concluded that the building suffered dam-
age sometime in 1758. In 1763 the city of Pisa filed suit against descendants of the archi-
tect, Purtroppo Piscial' acqua, claiming negligence in both the design and construction of
the building. The Court of Appeals of Tuscany affirmed the trial court's decision that the
statute of limitations accrued on the date of the injury and not the date of negligence. Id.
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architects and engineers, other parties involved in the construc-
tion process, such as building owners, tenants, suppliers and dis-
tributors are not similarly protected."' This circumstance has led
to numerous constitutional challenges to statutes of repose on the
basis of equal protection.1 2 Such statutes, however, have been
held constitutional even where the legislature has chosen to ex-
clude certain parties in the construction process.1 3 Courts in
these instances have allowed legislatures leeway in selectively
specifying parties to be covered under the statutes. 114
A. Rationale Behind Statutes of Repose
Legislatures have set forth three basic policy arguments to jus-
tify statutes of repose for design professionals. 1 5 First, the unfair-
ness of liability throughout a professional's lifetime fosters insta-
111 Alpern, supra note 48, at 1993-96.
112 The following cases have held statutes of repose unconstitutional: Jackson v. Man-
nesmann Demag Corp., 435 So. 2d 725, 728 (Ala. 1983) (violating due process clauses of
state constitution); Plant v. R.L. Reid, Inc., 313 So. 2d 518, 522 (Ala. 1975) (holding statute
too vague to enforce); Turner Construction Co. v. Scales, 752 P.2d 467, 470 (Alaska 1988)
(violating equal protection clause of state constitution); Fujioka v. Kam, 514 P.2d 568, 570
(Haw. 1973) (violating equal protection guarantee); Skinner v. Illinois, 231 N.E.2d 588, 591
(Ill. 1967) (violating constitutional provision that general assembly shall not grant to cor-
poration, association, or individual special or exclusive privilege, immunity, or franchise
whatsoever); Saylor v. Hall, 497 S.W.2d 218, 222 (Ky. 1973) (violating due process); Broome
v. Truluck, 241 S.E.2d 739, 740 (S.C. 1978) (holding statute violates equal protection ab-
sent showing of rational basis for discriminating against owners and manufacturers); Trin-
ity River Auth. v. URS Consultants, 889 S.W. 2d 259, 259 (Tex. 1994); Horton v.
Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087, 1090 (Utah 1989) (violating state constitution's
"open-courts" clause); Kallas Millwork v. Square D Co., 225 N.W.2d 454, 455 (Wis. 1975)
(holding statute denied equal protection and denied plaintiff a remedy duly recognized by
the laws of Wisconsin); cf Mullis v. Southern Co. Serv., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 579, 582 (Ga. 1982)
(holding statute was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary and did not violate equal protec-
tion clause of state and federal constitutions); Bouser v. City of Unicorn Park, 268 N.W.2d
332, 334 (Mich. 1978) (upholding constitutionality of six-year statutory period); Blaske v.
Smith & Entzeroth, Inc., 821 S.W.2d 822, 825 (Mo. 1991) (holding statute is not violative of
Equal Protection Clause or "open courts" provision); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Getty Oil Co., 782 P.2d 915, 916 (Okla. 1989) (holding statute was not violative of state
constitution); Hess v. Snyder Hunt Corp., 392 S.E.2d 817, 820 (Va. 1990) (holding statute
did not violate Equal Protection or Due Process Clauses).
113 See Alpern, supra note 48, at 1994.
114 Smith v. Allen-Bradley Co., 371 F. Supp. 698, 701 (W.D. Va. 1974) (stating that "leg-
islature may, within limits of rationality, determine what are actionable wrongs and the
time limits within which such lawsuits may be brought to redress such wrongs").
115 See Nischwitz, supra note 13, at 225. But see id. (listing objections to statutes of re-
pose). Arguments against the statute of repose are: (1) that liability insurance is available
to the design professional and the increased cost can be passed on to the customer; (2) the
passage of time hinders the plaintiff more than the defendant since the plaintiff bears the
burden of proof; and (3) plaintiff bears the burden to show that it was a defect and not
improper maintenance which was the culprit of the injury or damage. Id.
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bility in the construction industry. 116 Second, the difficulty in
producing reliable evidence long after the completion of the design
and construction causes great concern."' Finally, buildings have
long life spans" 8 and are particularly susceptible to deteriora-
tion." 9 In these cases negligent maintenance, rather than im-
proper design or specification of materials, could be the cause of
injuries.120
Therefore, statutes of repose are needed to promote fairness to
the design professional. Statutes of repose differ from the tradi-
tional statutes of limitation.12 1 Statutes of repose can circumvent
the cause of action before it manifests because discovery of the
defect, as required by the discovery rule, could occur after the re-
pose period. 122
A key distinction between the two forms of limitation is the time
at which the limitation period begins. 23 The ordinary statute of
116 Cotter, supra note 59, at 363 (addressing concern that architects theoretically could
be liable throughout their lifetime and opposes principle that liability should come to end).
117 Id. at 384. "Passage of time severely handicaps the defense of an action." Id.; see also
Nischwitz, supra note 13, at 225. "[Tlhe passage of time prejudices the defendant in his
defense." Id.
118 See Gary Herfel, Engineer's Liability: Does It Ever End?, SPECIYING ENG'R, July
1983, at 51 ("Buildings designed by engineers typically have effective useful lives of 20 to
100 years or longer."). "[B]uilding and engineering projects have life expectations measured
in decades, if not centuries .... " See E. Wayne Taff, A Defense Catalogue for the Design
Professional, 45 UMKC L. REv., 75, 91 (1976).
119 Id.
120 See Nischwitz, supra note 13, at 225. "[Tlhe question of improper maintenance by an
owner becomes a possibility as the proximate cause of an injury caused by structural fail-
ures." Id.; see also Herfel, supra note 118, at 51. One example of this phenomenon involves
reinforced concrete parking garages in the northern states in the late 1960s. Id. De-icing
salts and freeze-thaw cycles deteriorated these structure resulting in dangerous conditions
and injuries. Id.
121 See Cruz, supra note 48, at 519-20 n.51; Jayne Moore, Comment, Design for Chal-
lenge: The Kentucky Statute of Repose for Improvements to Real Property, 73 Ky. L.J. 1143,
1148-49 n.22 (1985). Statutes of repose tend to be considered substantive for conflict of law
purposes. See Baxter v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., Inc., 827 F. Supp. 96, 96 (D. Conn. 1993)
(predicting Connecticut Supreme Court will find that statute of repose is substantive for
conflict of law purposes).
122 See Nischwitz, supra note 13, at 225-26. This difference explains the terminology
used in describing the statutes. Id. Statutes of repose are considered preemptive, while
statutes of limitation are prescriptive. Id.; see also Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So. 2d 415, 418 (Fla.
1992) The court stated:
[11n contrast to a statute of limitation, a statute of repose precludes a right of action
after a specified time which is measured from the incident of malpractice, sale of a
product, or completion of improvements, rather than establishing a time period within
which the action must be brought measured from the point in time when the cause of
action accrued.
Id.
123 SWEET, supra note 50, § 1107, at 258. See Moore, supra note 121, at 1148 n.22; ; see
also Bauld v. J. A. Jones Constr. Co., 357 So. 2d 401, 402 (Fla. 1978)).
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limitations commences on the date the cause of action accrues,
while the statute of repose period begins to run on a specific
date. 124 This date is usually the point at which the project is sub-
stantially completed, regardless of whether there has been an in-
jury or whether a cause of action has accrued. 125 Statutes of re-
pose merely define legal rights or the lack thereof on the basis of
time. 12
6
B. Interrelationship of Statutes of Limitation and Repose
04.a4-,-^ . . .j-, m- n .. . . ,1 __..,,.. So + + ,- .s O V 1 .
legislative enactment of a statute of repose does not nullify a de-
Rather than establishing a time limit within which [an] action must be brought, mea-
sured from the time of accrual of the cause of action, these [statutes of repose] provi-
sions cut off the right of action after a specified time measured from the delivery of a
product or the completion of work. They do so regardless of the time of the accrual of
the cause of action or of notice of the invasion of a legal right.
Id.
124 See Moore, supra note 121, at 1148 n.22 (explaining statutes of repose begin to run at
artificial points in time not relating to injuries sustained).
125 Id. One problem with statutes of repose is determining when completion occurs.
Some statutes have addressed this problem by specifically defining the point at which the
statute runs. See, e.g., 10 DEL. CODE ANN. § 8127 (Supp. 1987). The Delaware statute al-
lows actions to be brought within six years from the earliest of the following dates:
a. The date of purported completion of all the work called for by the contract as pro-
vided by the contract if such date has been agreed to in the contract itself;
b. The date when the statute of limitations commences to run in relation to the partic-
ular phase or segment of work performed pursuant to the contract in which the alleged
deficiency occurred, where such date for such phase or segment of work has been spe-
cifically provided for in the contract itself;
c. The date when the statute of limitations commences to run in relation to the con-
tract itself where such date has been specifically provided for in the contract itself;
d. The date when payment in full has been received by the person against whom the
action is brought for the particular phase of such construction or for the particular
phase of such designing, planning, supervision, and/or observation of such construction
or manner of such construction, as the case may be, in which the alleged deficiency
occurred;
e. The date the person against whom the action is brought has received final payment
in full, under the contract for the construction or for the designing, planning, supervi-
sion, and/or observation of construction, as the case may be, called for by contract;
f. The date when the construction of such improvement as called for by the contract
has been substantially completed;
g. The date when an improvement has been accepted, as provided in the contract, by
the owner or occupant thereof following the commencement of such construction;
h. For alleged personal injuries also, the date upon which it is claimed that such al-
leged injuries were sustained; or after the period of limitations provided in the con-
tract, if the contract provides such a period and if such period expires prior to the
expiration of 2 years from whichever of the foregoing dates is earliest.
Id.
126 ARcHTECTs AND ENGINEERS, supra note 45, at 365; CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION HAND-
BOOK, supra note 9, § 22.04, at 408. 'The unique and distinctive feature of statutes of re-
pose is that they dissolve all grounds of liability ... solely by the lapse of time." Id.
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fense based on a statute of limitations.'2 7 Nevertheless, they must
be considered separately. The statute of repose does not extend
the statute of limitations. 128 Rather, it is an absolute limitation
preventing all claims outside the specified period.12 9 Claims insti-
tuted under the statute of repose are actionable so long as they are
also instituted within the statute of limitations period. 13 0
IV. IN SUPPORT OF STATUTES OF REPOSE
It is clear that the ineffectual protection offered by statutes of
limitations has posed significant obstacles for innovative design
professionals. 13 1 Skyrocketing insurance rates faced by design
professionals and requirements that small practitioners obtain
unreasonable amounts of coverage are palpable examples of the
weakness of statutes of limitation and evidence the need for stat-
utes of repose. 1 3
2
Further, reliance on statutes of limitation for protection of de-
sign professionals is misplaced. 133 The traditional rule, although
offering more protection than the discovery rule in the construc-
tion context, seems to have little support in the judiciary. '4 Areas
in which the discovery rule is enforced, such as the medical profes-
sion and the manufacturing industry, are manifestly different
from the construction industry.'3 5 Both the medical profession
and the manufacturing industry involve the repetition of a tech-
nique or product that is proven to be effective. 136 By its very na-
ture, the work of a design professional calls for artistic creativity,
and thus requires a different standard than other industries.
137
127 See ARCHrrECTS AND ENGINEERS, supra note 45, at 122.
128 Id.
129 See Nischwitz, supra note 13, at 225.
130 Id. Statistical evidence, which supports the need for statutes of repose, suggests few
legitimate claims are brought after a certain period of time elapses. Cotter, supra note 59,
at 363.
131 See Nischwitz, supra note 13, at 226-27. In the area of workers' compensation, for
example, the design professional is exposed to liability. Id. While workers' compensation
laws do not permit employees to sue their employers, injured parties are not precluded
from suing the design professional. Id.
132 See ArroRNEY GENERAL Comm., supra note 48, at 1-5.
133 See supra notes 94-103 and accompanying text.
134 See ATroRNEY GENERAL Comm., supra note 48, at 1-5.
135 See Cotter, supra note 59, at 383.
136 Id. at 380. In assessing the differences between manufacturing and construction, Cot-
ter notes, "'[tihe manufacturer makes standard goods and develops standard processes.'"
Id. (quoting 2 F. HARPER & JAMEs, THE LAW OF ToRTs § 18.5 (1956)).
137 Id.
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Expanded liability has a "chilling effect on creativity."138 In addi-
tion, in medical malpractice and attorney malpractice, the injury
is likely to occur between parties in privity.139 Hence the time that
might elapse between the injury and discovery is naturally lim-
ited. 140 Herein lies the major difference between the two varieties
of professional malpractice. 14 1 Furthermore, in medical malprac-
tice and products liability, the chance of a defect being aggravated
by intervening forces in the control of the plaintiff is slim. 142 What
may have been a harmless error on the part of the architect or
engineer can be aggravated greatly by subsequent acts of owners
or those responsible for upkeep of the facility. 1 4 3
V. CONCLUSION
The design professional's stock-in-trade is creativity. Innovative
structural designs are the signatures of America's great architects
and engineers. In this era, however, an alarmingly high rate of
projects are refused each year due to the threat of liability for de-
fects that are beyond the control of the design professional. Such
long-term, seemingly perpetual, liability impedes creativity and
increases costs throughout the construction industry.
One measure intended to alleviate the liability of design profes-
sionals is the statute of limitations. Under the traditional rule, a
statute of limitations frequently protected a design professional
from liability due to a latent defect that did not appear until years
after the statute had run. The more modern discovery rule, how-
ever, offers little protection because the statute of limitations usu-
ally does not begin to run until the defect is found. Since the judi-
cial trend favors the discovery rule, statutes of limitation are
increasingly ineffective to protect design professionals. Statutes
138 Earley, supra note 37, at 317 (1977). In discussing the "chilling effect on creativity"
that results from excessive liability "Itihe availability of third party liability coupled with
the publicity of a few disproportionate recoveries serves to deter creativity." Id. (citation
omitted).
139 Cotter, supra note 59, at 383. The activities of physicians and attorneys usually affect
only the patient or the client. Id. This provides built-in immunity from third party suits in
most cases. Id.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 383. "The attorney's and physician's malpractice is normally manifested within
a few years. . . but it is very possible that, given the durability of buildings, the conse-
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of repose offer a far more effective form of protection against per-
petual liability.
Statutes of repose strike a balance between protecting design
professionals against stale claims and offering claimants the right
to seek redress for their injuries. Statutes of repose place an abso-
lute time limit on when a design professional can be held liable for
a negligent design. Holding design professionals perpetually lia-
ble for structures over which they have no future control costs so-
ciety in the form of unnecessary lawsuits and impedes innovation
in building design. The most effective way to revitalize the con-
struction industry is to limit the liability of design professionals
through the use of statutes of repose.
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